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PROPERTY 
W. Wade Berryhill* 
The General Assembly made several minor changes affecting 
property law in Virginia. The most significant of these changes was 
the amendment of the Code's provisions regarding a spouse's 
dower and curtesy interests in the separate estate of a deceased 
spouse. In addition to this legislation, the Virginia Supreme Court 
decided several cases dealing with varied property issues. The deci-
sions discussed below are those which should have the most inter-
est to the general practitioner. The real estate specialist, no doubt, 
is already aware of most of them. 
In the majority of the cases which follow, the Virginia Supreme 
Court affirms and reinforces long-standing judicial precedent in 
Virginia. The most significant development deals with zoning regu-
lations and residential restrictive covenants which affect group 
homes for the mentally handicapped. In another decision, the 
court had the opportunity to recognize tortious interference with a 
prospective contract for the sale of real estate as a cause of action 
for the first time. 
I. 1985 LEGISLATION 
Although the 1985 session of the General Assembly made many 
minor changes affecting several aspects of property law,1 possibly 
the most significant change was the codification of Jacobs v. 
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.S., 1967, 
Arkansas State University; J.D., 1972, University of Arkansas; LL.M., 1976, Columbia Uni-
versity. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of J. Thomas O'Brien, Jr., T.C. 
Williams School of Law, University of Richmond, Class of 1986. 
1. For examples of some areas affected, see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1511, -1513 (Cum. 
Supp. 1985) (agricultural and forest districts); id. §§ 55-248.5, -248.9:1, -248.11, -248.39 (the 
Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act); id. § 55-66.4:2 (certificates of satisfaction); 
id. §§ 58.1-3928, -3929 (repealed by Acts of 1985), -3930 (place of recording); id. §§ 55-318, 
-321 (division of fences); id. § 17.59 (authorizing the clerk of court to refuse any writing for 
recordation unless (i) each person's surname, where it first appears is either underscored or 
in capital letters, (ii) each page is numbered, and (iii) the code section under which any 
exemption from recordation taxes is clearly set forth). This list is not intended to be com-
prehensive, but merely to highlight a few of the changes. 
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Meade. 2 In that decision, the Virginia Supreme Court interpreted 
a provision in the Virginia Code3 which purported to exclude a 
husband's right to curtesy in his deceased wife's sole separate equi-
table estate. The court, in construing the statute so as to avoid a 
constitutional attack,4 relied upon a code provision which states 
that dower and curtesy are to be "synonymous . . . for all pur-
poses, "5 and concluded that the "interchange of 'curtesy' and 
'dower' requires substitution of 'husband' for 'wife' and 'him' for 
'her.' "6 Thus, the court held that a surviving wife's right to dower 
shall not attach to her husband's sole separate equitable estate. 
The legislature codified this decision by eliminating all refer-
ences to husband or wife and instead using the word "spouse."7 
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
A. Brokers' Commissions 
In Burruss Timber Co. v. Frith,8 the Virginia Supreme Court 
found that a sale of stock and subsequent corporate merger which 
transferred the total assets of a timber company was not a "sale of 
land." Since the transaction was not "substantially the equivalent" 
of the sales which the broker was authorized to make, the broker 
was not entitled to receive a commission. Frith, the plaintiff bro-
ker, entered into an exclusive listing agreement with Burruss Land 
and Lumber Company covering thirty-two parcels of land in 
Southwest Virginia. Approximately three months later, Burruss 
2. 227 Va. 284, 315 S.E.2d 383 (1984). 
3. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-21 (Repl. Vol. 1980). Prior to amendment that provision read 
as follows: 
Id. 
When no curtesy in separate estate. -A surviving husband shall not be entitled to 
curtesy in the equitable separate estate of the deceased wife if such right thereto has 
been expressly excluded by the instrument creating the same, or if such instrument, 
executed heretofore or hereafter, describes the estate as her sole and separate equita-
ble estate. 
4. See Jacobs, 227 Va. at 287, 315 S.E.2d at 385. 
5. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19.1 (Repl. Vol. 1980). 
6. 227 Va. at 288, 315 S.E.2d at 385. 
7. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-21 (Cum. Supp. 1985), which now reads: 
When no dower or curtesy in separate estate.-A surviving spouse shall not be enti-
tled to dower or curtesy in the equitable separate estate of the deceased spouse if 
such right thereto has been expressly excluded by the instrument creating the same, 
or if such instrument, executed heretofore or hereafter, describes the estate as his or 
her sole and separate equitable estate. 
8. 228 Va. 701, 324 S.E.2d 679 (1985). 
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Land and Lumber Company entered into an "open" listing agree-
ment with another broker for the sale of all its assets in all states. 
Frith assisted this broker by showing the Virginia parcels to Bos-
ton/Lyme Timber Company. Nearly three years later, Boston/ 
Lyme Timber Company purchased all of the shares of Burruss 
Land and Lumber Company and merged with it to form Burruss 
Timber Company, the defendant. 
Frith brought an action against Burruss Timber Company for a 
commission on the sale of the Virginia parcels. The trial court 
made three :findings: first, that although Frith's listing agreement 
had no time frame, it had expired; second, that the stock transfer 
and merger did amount to a sale of land; and :finally, that Frith 
was entitled to $80,000 in quantum meruit for procuring the sale. 
The supreme court reversed the decision, distinguishing the four 
out-of-state cases upon which Frith relied.9 In each of those cases 
the broker was employed to sell all of the corporation's assets. As 
such, the stock sale, exchange, or merger was the "substantial 
equivalent" of the sale for which the broker was employed. In the 
instant case, however, Frith was employed to sell thirty-two tracts 
of land in Virginia-only one-sixth of Burruss Land's total assets. 
Tran sf er of all of its assets in four states was not the "substantial 
equivalent" of the sales that Frith was authorized to make. Conse-
quently, the court concluded that there was no sale of land enti-
tling Frith to a commission.10 
B. Contracts 
1. Tortious Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations 
In Allen Realty Corp. v. Holbert, 11 a case of first impression,12 
the Virginia Supreme Court found that the plaintiff, Allen Realty 
Corporation (Allen) had stated a cause of action against Holbert 
based upon tortious interference with a prospective contract. Allen 
hired Rawlings, a firm of certified public accountants, to assist in 
its liquidation, as well as to provide tax and accounting services 
9. See Seward v. M. Seward & Son Co., 91 Conn. 190, 99 A. 887 (1916); Kingston Dev. Co. 
v. Kenerly, 132 Ga. App. 346, 110 S.E.2d 118 (1974); Benedict v. Dakin, 243 ill. 384, 90 N.E. 
712 (1910); Morad v. Haddad, 329 Mass. 730, 110 N.E.2d 364 (1953). 
10. 228 Va. at 705-06, 324 S.E.2d at 682. 
11. 227 Va. 441, 318 S.E.2d 592 (1984). 
12. 227 Va. at 449, 318 S.E.2d at 597. The court noted that other jurisdictions had previ-
ously recognized the cause of action in question. See Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4th 195 (1981). 
772 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:769 
and business advice. Holbert, the defendant and Rawlings' agent, 
received several offers to buy Allen's real property but failed to 
disclose an offer from the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing 
Authority.13 
Allen brought suit claiming, among other things, tortious inter-
ference with contractual relations on the part of Holbert. Holbert 
demurred, and the trial court dismissed the action. The supreme 
court reversed and found that Allen's motion for judgment suffi-
ciently alleged Holbert's interference with Allen's prospective con-
tractual relations. The court explained that "[t]he cause of action 
arises from an intentional, improper interference with another's 
contract relations, and this interference must (1) induce or other-
wise cause a third-party not to enter into prospective contract with 
the plaintiff, or (2) prevent the plaintiff from entering into a 
contract. "14 
2. Anticipatory Repudiation of a Contract 
In Link v. Weizenbaum,1 11 the Virginia Supreme Court ruled 
that where only one of two joint obligors to a contract anticipato-
rily repudiates, there is no breach of contract since the remaining 
obligor is bound to perform. The defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Wei-
zenbaum, jointly executed a contract to purchase property from 
the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Link. Prior to the closing, Mr. Wei-
zenbaum informed the Links' agent that he did not intend to close 
on the property. 
The Links filed suit against the W eizenbaums two days before 
the scheduled closing, alleging anticipatory repudiation. No evi-
dence was presented that Mrs. WeiZenbaum was not willing to 
close. The jury found for the Links, but the trial court set aside the 
verdict as to Mrs. Weizenbaum. Subsequently, the trial court 
granted Mr. Weizenbaum's motion to dismiss on the ground that 
there was no breach of contract because his wife, being a joint obli-
gor, was bound to close. 
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court set out the requirements 
for an anticipatory repudiation action, stating that "the repudia-
tion must be clear and unequivocal, and it must cover the entire 
13. The authority's offer, had it been accepted, would have amounted to a savings of over 
$35,000 to Allen. Holbert, 227 Va. at 445, 318 S.E.2d at 594. 
14. Id. at 449, 318 S.E.2d at 597. 
15. 229 Va. 201, 326 S.E.2d 667 (1985). 
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performance of the contract."16 Although Mr. Weizenbaum's repu-
diation was clear and unequivocal, it could not serve as a basis for 
the action because Mrs. Weizenbaum did not join in the repudia-
tion. Thus, the repudiation did not cover the entire performance of 
the contract. 
C. Deeds 
In Amos v. Coffey,11 the supreme court affirmed the trial court's 
decision which held that a "Mother Hubbard" clause following a 
metes and bounds description effectively conveyed the grantor's 
one-twelfth remainder interest in real estate located in Pitt-
sylvania County which was not intended to be included in the 
metes and bounds description. The plaintiff, Mrs. Amos, executed 
a deed to the defendant, Mr. Coffey, to convey "all of those certain 
tracts or parcels of land-in or near the Town of Gretna."18 Fol-
lowing a metes and bounds description of the parcels in Gretna, 
the deed explicitly provided that it was the plaintiff's intention to 
convey all of her real estate in Pittsylvania County.19 
The plaintiff filed a bill of complaint asking the trial court to 
construe the deed as having conveyed only the real estate located 
in Gretna and not the one-twelfth remainder interest in her fa-
ther's Pittsylvania County farm. The trial court held for the defen-
dant, and the plaintiff appealed because the trial court refused to 
use extrinsic evidence in determining the meaning of the terms of 
the deed. The supreme court, applying the "plain meaning" rule, 
held that the deed was unambiguous on its face and affirmed. The 
plaintiff contended that the broad, general language making up the 
"Mother Hubbard" clause should be construed as merely a refer-
ence to the metes and bounds description. However, the supreme 
court, relying on an earlier interpretation of the ejusdem generis 
doctrine which they had adopted in Stephen Putney Shoe Co. v. 
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Co.,20 found that 
the metes and bounds description exhausted the particular class of 
property in Gretna. Moreover, the supreme court ruled that the 
16. Id. at 203, 326 S.E.2d at 668. 
17. 228 Va. 88, 320 S.E.2d 335 (1984). 
18. Id. at 90, 320 S.E.2d at 336. 
19. The deed provided: "It is the intention of the party of the first part to convey to the 
party of the second part all the real estate which they now own in Pittsylvania County, 
Virginia, including but not restricted to the lands described above." Id. 
20. 116 Va. 211, 220, 81 S.E. 93, 97 (1914). 
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general description in the "Mother Hubbard" clause was effective 
to convey the plaintiff's one-twelfth remainder interest in her fa-
ther's Pittsylvania County farm. 
D. Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded 
1. Zoning 
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,21 the United 
States Supreme Court struck down a local zoning ordinance which 
required that a "special use" permit be obtained by the Cleburne 
Living Center (CLC), a group home for the mentally retarded.22 
The Cleburne City Council refused to issue CLC the permit citing, 
inter alia, property owners' attitudes, the location of a junior high 
school, fears of elderly residents, and the size of the home and 
number of people to be housed. 23 
After the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Texas denied CLC relief, CLC appealed the case to the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals and successfully argued that the zoning 
ordinance violated the equal protection clause of the United States 
Constitution. 24 The Fifth Circuit chose to view this as a case of 
first impression, stating "we can find no appellate opinions directly 
deciding the proper characterization of mentally retarded persons 
for Equal Protection analysis."211 The court of appeals concluded 
that while mental retardates were not a suspect class, they did 
share enough characteristics with a suspect class to be viewed as a 
"quasi-suspect" class.26 The court of appeals declared that laws 
discriminating against a "quasi-suspect" class warranted interme-
diate scrutiny.27 This level of judicial scrutiny rendered the ordi-
nance invalid for want of substantially furthering an important 
21. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). 
22. Section 8 of Cleburne's zoning ordinance listed the permitted uses of an R-3 district, 
in which the Cleburne Living Center site was located. Apartment houses, multiple dwellings, 
boarding and lodging houses, fraternity and sorority houses, dormitories, hotels, hospitals, 
sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the aged, private clubs and fraternal organi-
zations were all allowed. Section 16, subdivision 9 of the same ordinance required that spe-
cial use permits be obtained for "hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, or alcoholics or 
drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions to be operated anywhere in the city." Id. 
at 3252-53 n.3. 
23. Id. at 3259. 
24. 726 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1984). 
25. Id. at 196. 
26. Id. at 198. 
27. Id. 
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governmental purpose.28 
After rehearing was denied,29 the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and held that the mentally retarded were not a 
quasi-suspect class.30 As such, no intermediate scrutiny was to be 
applied. Rather, "the Equal Protection Clause requires only that 
the classification drawn by the statute be rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest."31 
Yet, even with the wide latitude given state interest under the 
rational relationship test, the Court further held that no rational 
relationship could be found by requiring the CLC to obtain a spe-
cial use permit. Any differences between a group home for the 
mentally retarded and boarding houses or hospitals were held to be 
irrelevant to the city's legitimate interests.32 
2. Restrictive Covenants 
In contrast to the zoning restrictions struck down by the United 
States Supreme Court,33 the Virginia Supreme Court, in Omega 
Corp. v. Malloy,34 addressed the issue of whether a restrictive cov-
enant limiting the use of property to residential purposes and sin-
gle-family dwellings would exclude group homes for the mentally 
retarded. Omega had purchased two lots, one in each of two resi-
dential subdivisions. They proposed to build a dwelling on each 
"to provide mentally retarded adults with normal residential hous-
ing in a community setting including the activities and life-style 
incident to such a setting."35 Homeowners in both subdivisions 
28. The city of Cleburne argued Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) and Doe v. 
Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3rd Cir. 1979), pointing out the fact that no classification of height-
ened scrutiny was afforded the mentally retarded. The city also pointed out that heightened 
scrutiny had never been used in the testing of a zoning ordinance. Only a rational basis 
criterion should be required for a local government objective. 
29. 735 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1984). 
30. 105 S. Ct. at 3251. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 3259. 
33. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text. 
34. 228 Va. 12, 319 S.E.2d 728 (1984). 
35. Id. at 14, 319 S.E.2d at 729. Testimony revealed that the homes were to be licensed by 
the commonwealth and that the occupants were to be supervised by counselors employed by 
Chesterfield County Mental Retardation Services. Each home was to be occupied by four 
moderately mentally retarded adults who were to "leave the homes in early morning for 
work, vocational training or some other day activity" and return in late afternoon. Id. Time 
at home would be supervised by the counselors and would be spent cleaning, cooking, and 
performing other household chores as well as engaging in various leisure activities. Although 
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sought injunctions to restrain Omega from using its lots for the 
proposed group homes on the grounds that each subdivision con-
tained the following identical, restrictive covenant: 
No lot shall be used except for residential purposes. No building 
shall be erected, altered, placed, or permitted to remain on any lot 
other than one detached single-family dwelling not to exceed two 
stories in height. 86 
The chancellor granted both permanent injunctions. In his letter 
opinion, the chancellor stated: 
I believe that the restrictive covenants in question limit the use of 
the buildings to single family dwellings, as well as the type of con-
struction. I believe that a single family dwelling means what it says. 
Only one family can inhabit the dwelling. . . . A single family use 
does not include occupancy by unrelated persons who live in the 
home with a counselor. 87 
On appeal Omega disagreed with the chancellor's analysis, con-
tending that the first sentence of the covenants created a "use re-
striction" while the second sentence merely imposed a "structural 
restriction." Although the lots were restricted to residential pur-
poses, Omega asserted that the "structural restriction" merely con-
trols "the type of buildings that may be constructed, not the type 
of persons who might choose to live in them."38 Thus, the "struc-
tural restriction" imposes no further "use restriction." 
In rejecting Omega's contentions, the court noted that "Virginia 
precedent . . . supports the dual effect the chancellor gave the 
'single-family dwelling' language,"39 and ruled that the covenants 
must be read together.40 When the sentences were read together, 
the court concluded that "the covenants specify that only dwell-
ings designed structurally for single-family occupancy may be 
this environment was to provide full-time supervision, no training of any kind would be 
provided to the occupants in the homes. Id. at 16, 319 S.E.2d at 730. 
36. Id. at 14-15, 319 S.E.2d at 729 (emphasis added). 
37. Id. at 16, 319 S.E.2d at 730. 
38. Id. at 16-17, 319 S.E.2d at 730. 
39. Id. at 17, 319 S.E.2d at 730 (relying on Schwarzschild v. Welborne, 186 Va. 1052, 45 
S.E.2d 152 (1947)). 
40. Id. at 17, 319 S.E.2d at 731 (relying on Friedberg v. Building Comm., 218 Va. 659, 665, 
239 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1977)). 
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erected and that the buildings may be used only for single-family 
residential purposes. "41 
As the homeowners appeared to concede that Omega's use of the 
proposed buildings would be for residential purposes,42 the court 
was ultimately faced with the question of whether a group home 
for the mentally retarded constituted a "single-family use." Omega 
argued that restrictive covenants are to be strictly construed 
against the party seeking enforcement. As the covenants in no way 
purported to limit the definition of "family," the term should be 
interpreted broadly to include mentally retarded persons in group 
homes.43 Therefore, Omega concluded that the chancellor's ruling 
that "[a] single family use does not include occupancy by unre-
lated persons"44 was clearly wrong. 
Although the court agreed that covenants are to be strictly con-
strued and that "family" should be interpreted broadly,45 it con-
cluded that "[t]he presence of the counselors in the homes ... 
would convert what might otherwise have been a single-family use 
into what the chancellor termed 'a facility.' "46 Thus, the court up-
held the chancellor's ruling that "[a] single family use does not in-
clude occupancy by unrelated persons who live in the home with a 
counselor."47 Additionally, the court rejected any applicability of 
the zoning cases from other jurisdictions.48 
41. Id. at 18, 319 S.E.2d at 731. The dissent sharply criticized the majority's implication 
of a "dual effect" to the "single-family dwelling" language as being contrary to the estab-
lished principle that restrictive covenants are to be construed narrowlY.. Justice Thomas 
pointed out that the Schwarzschild decision, upon which the majority relied to imply the 
"dual-effect" of the term dwelling, struck down an attempt to restrict a use. Thus, the dis-
sent concluded, the majority's reliance upon Schwarzschild was misplaced in upholding a 
restriction. Id. at 22-23, 319 S.E.2d at 734 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
42. Id. at 18, 319 S.E.2d at 731. 
43. Id. at 18-19, 319 S.E.2d at 731. 
44. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
45. 228 Va. at 19, 319 S.E.2d at 732. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 18, 319 S.E.2d at 731 (emphasis in original). The dissent also criticized the 
majority for concluding that four unrelated mentally retarded adults and a counselor did 
not fall within the broad definition of "family" while giving no indication of what groups 
would be included. Id. at 23, 319 S.E.2d at 734 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
48. Id. at 20, 319 S.E.2d at 732. The court held that it was dealing with "private contrac-
tual rights arising from restrictive covenants, and not with provisions of zoning ordi-
nances ..•• [Z]oning ordinances cannot relieve the lots in question from the restrictive cov-
enants to which they are subject." Id. For a discussion of a recent United States Supreme 
Court decision dealing with zoning restrictions on group homes for the mentally retarded, 
see supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text. 
